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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the extent to which delayed expected loan loss recog-
nition (DELR) is associated with greater vulnerability of banks to three dis-
tinct dimensions of risk: (1) stock market liquidity risk, (2) downside tail
risk of individual banks, and (3) codependence of downside tail risk among
banks. We hypothesize that DELR increases vulnerability to downside risk by
creating expected loss overhangs that threaten future capital adequacy and
by degrading bank transparency, which increases financing frictions and op-
portunities for risk-shifting. We find that DELR is associated with higher cor-
relations between bank-level illiquidity and both aggregate banking sector
illiquidity and market returns (i.e., higher liquidity risks) during recessions,
suggesting that high DELR banks as a group may simultaneously face elevated
financing frictions and enhanced opportunities for risk-shifting behavior in
crisis periods. With respect to downside risk, we find that during recessions
DELR is associated with significantly higher risk of individual banks suffer-
ing severe drops in their equity values, where this association is magnified
for banks with low capital levels. Consistent with increased systemic risk, we
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find that DELR is associated with significantly higher codependence between
downside risk of individual banks and downside risk of the banking sector.
We theorize that downside risk vulnerability at the individual bank level can
translate into systemic risk by virtue of DELR creating a common source of
risk vulnerability across high DELR banks simultaneously, which leads to risk
codependence among banks and systemic effects from banks acting as part of
a herd.
JEL codes: G20; G21; M40; M41
Keywords: bank; transparency; loan loss provisions; delayed loss recogni-
tion; risk; systemic risk
1. Introduction
Banks take on risks that are opaque and difficult to verify. Of particular
concern to bank regulators is excessive risk-taking by individual banks and
systemic risk, which requires a focus not on the risk of individual banks, but
on an individual bank’s contribution to the risk of the financial system as
a whole (e.g., Brunnermeier et al. [2009], Acharya et al. [2010], Hanson,
Kashyap, and Stein [2011], Bisias et al. [2012]). An important unresolved
issue is the extent to which bank transparency plays a role in mitigating
or exacerbating such risk concerns. We define bank transparency as the
availability of bank-specific information to those outside of the bank, which
includes depositors, investors, borrowers, counterparties, regulators, pol-
icy makers, and competitors.1 A key source of bank transparency is pub-
licly disclosed financial reports, which provide bank-specific information
to investors and regulators seeking to understand a bank’s fundamentals
in order to guide investment decisions, discipline risk-taking, and enhance
stability. Accounting policy choices can therefore potentially affect bank
risk by impacting bank transparency. In addition to this transparency role,
accounting policy can affect bank stability through its influence over the
accounting numbers as quantitative inputs into numerical calculations of
regulatory covenant measures such as capital ratios and leverage ratios that
banks must continually maintain (e.g., Beatty and Liao [2011, 2014]).
In this paper, we investigate relations between banks’ accounting pol-
icy choices and both individual bank risk and risk codependence among
banks. We capture cross-bank variation in accounting policy choices by ex-
ploiting differences in the discretionary application of loan loss account-
ing rules across U.S. commercial banks to estimate the extent to which
individual banks delay expected loan loss recognition in current provisions
1 Transparency is the joint output of a multifaceted system whose component parts collec-
tively produce, gather, validate, and disseminate information to participants outside the firm.
Components include audited, publicly available accounting information, information inter-
mediaries such as financial analysts, credit rating agencies and the media, regulatory reports
(including stress test disclosures), banks’ voluntary disclosures, and information transmitted
by securities prices (Bushman and Smith [2003], Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith [2004]).
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(DELR). We then use a difference in difference design to investigate the
extent to which DELR is associated with greater vulnerability of banks to
three distinct dimensions of risk during economic downturns: (1) liquidity
risk, which reflects how closely bank-level stock market illiquidity co-moves
with aggregate banking sector illiquidity and stock returns; (2) downside
tail risk of individual banks; and (3) codependence of downside tail risk
among banks (i.e., system-wide risk).
Reductions in transparency can induce greater investor uncertainty
about banks’ intrinsic value, weaken market discipline over risk-taking be-
havior, and mask banks’ efforts to suppress negative information that will
be revealed in future periods. Accounting policy choices can plausibly im-
pact bank transparency. We hypothesize that DELR is a manifestation of
opportunistic loan provisioning behavior, which results in reduced bank
transparency. To examine this hypothesis, we build on an extensive litera-
ture linking transparency to stock market illiquidity and liquidity risk (e.g.,
Amihud, Mendelson, and Pedersen [2005]). Liquidity risk reflects how
closely bank-level stock market illiquidity co-moves with aggregate bank-
ing sector illiquidity and stock returns. Brunnermeier and Pedersen [2009]
and Vayanos [2004] show that liquidity can dry up in crises when liquidity
providers flee from assets with high levels of uncertainty about fundamen-
tal value. Brunnermeier and Pedersen [2009] argue that systematic shocks
to the funding of liquidity providers can generate co-movement in liquidity
across assets, particularly for stocks with greater uncertainty about intrinsic
value. Further, Lang and Maffett [2011] empirically document that nonfi-
nancial firms with lower transparency suffer greater increases in liquidity
risk during crisis periods. Thus, to the extent that DELR reflects bank trans-
parency, we expect higher DELR to be associated with higher bank illiq-
uidity and liquidity risk, and that these associations will be stronger during
crisis periods. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that DELR is associ-
ated with higher stock market illiquidity and a higher correlation between
bank-level illiquidity and aggregate banking sector illiquidity and returns
during recessions. 2 While stock illiquidity generally increases during eco-
nomic recessions (Naes, Skjeltorp, and Arne Ødegaard [2011]), our results
show that recessionary increases in illiquidity and liquidity risk are more se-
vere for banks with higher levels of DELR.3 This has important implications
for bank risk and stability.
First, illiquidity levels and liquidity risks associated with higher DELR
increase equity financing costs, which can impede access to new equity
2While we show a relation between DELR and equity financing frictions, DELR-driven opac-
ity may also negatively impact access to credit funding and the terms demanded by creditors
to supply such funding (e.g., Kashyap and Stein [1995, 2000], Ratnovski [2013]). This is an
important avenue for future research.
3 Our within banking sector analysis of DELR and illiquidity complements Flannery, Kwan,
and Nimalendran [2013] across industry analysis showing that crises raise the adverse selection
costs of trading bank shares relative to nonbank control firms.
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financing needed to replenish capital depleted by recessionary losses.4 In
this regard, our illiquidity results extend and complement Beatty and Liao
[2011], who raise the possibility that DELR may increase equity financing
frictions without specifying how and why this might occur.5 By establishing
a formal connection between DELR and transparency, we also complement
Bushman and Williams [2012], who find that higher DELR is associated
with more pronounced risk-shifting by banks, consistent with diminished
transparency inhibiting monitoring by outsiders. Our liquidity risk results
also have implications for systemic risk. Increased co-movement between
bank-level illiquidity and banking sector illiquidity and returns suggests that
high DELR banks as a group will simultaneously face elevated financing
frictions when the banking sector is experiencing distress that impedes the
group’s access to new capital infusions. Further, DELR-induced reductions
in transparency can dampen discipline of risk-taking for high DELR banks
and result in these banks as a group exploiting opacity to engage in risk-
shifting behavior during crisis periods.
While our illiquidity analyses suggest that DELR degrades bank trans-
parency, loan loss provisioning policies also directly affect reported
capital.6 When a bank delays recognition of expected losses, it creates an
overhang of unrecognized expected losses that carry forward to the future.
Loss overhangs can increase capital inadequacy concerns during crises by
compromising the ability of loan loss reserves to cover both unexpected re-
cessionary loan losses and loss overhangs from previous periods. Thus DELR
can negatively impact capital levels during a crisis while at the same time in-
hibiting banks’ ability to replenish capital by increasing financing frictions
via reduced transparency. This can create capital inadequacy concerns that
increase the vulnerability to severe downside risk of individual banks and of
the banking system as a whole. Such increases in downside risk vulnerability
can derive from banks’ reactions to capital inadequacy concerns as well as
from actions by other players such as inter-bank lenders, other short-term
creditors, and regulators responding to heightened concerns about bank
insolvency.
4 Acharya and Petersen [2005] decompose the CAPM beta to show that cost of capital is a
function of illiquidity levels and liquidity risk. See also Pa´stor and Stambaugh [2003] and Lou
and Sadka [2011].
5 Beatty and Liao [2011] show that higher DELR banks exhibit smaller increases in book
equity during economic downturns. They suggest two possible drivers of this result: (1) the
cost of raising equity is higher during recessions and so low DELR banks raise more equity in
good times to compensate for their higher provisions, and (2) the cost of raising equity during
recessions is relatively higher for high DELR banks. We provide evidence consistent with this
latter conjecture and isolate opacity-driven illiquidity (risk) as a specific mechanism through
which DELR operates to increase financing frictions.
6 It is also possible that banks set target capital levels above regulatory requirements in order
to maintain a specific standing in credit markets (e.g., Berger et al. [2008]). To the extent that
target capital levels are set based on reported accounting capital, DELR can still have a role in
exacerbating downside risk through its effect on bank capital.
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Specifically, negative consequences of capital inadequacy include re-
duced bank lending (e.g., Bernanke and Lown [1991], Bolton and Freixas
[2006], Beatty and Liao [2011]), deleveraging via asset sales potentially at
fire sale prices (e.g., Hanson, Kashyap, and Stein [2011]), increased risk-
shifting incentives (e.g., Mehran, Acharya, and Thakor [2013]), decreased
probability of survival, competitive position and market share (e.g., Berger
and Bouwman [2013]), and increased borrowing costs and decreased avail-
ability of credit (e.g., Afonso and Schoar [2011], Kashyap and Stein [1995],
[2000], Ratnovski [2013]).7 We do not attempt to differentiate such nega-
tive consequences individually, but instead consider the overall effect of
DELR on downside risk from all sources collectively as reflected in the dis-
tributions over changes in market values of a bank’s equity and assets.
Following Adrian and Brunnermeier [2011], we estimate conditional,
time-varying distributions over future equity returns, and examine whether
DELR affects the likelihood of severe negative outcomes. Using quantile re-
gression, we estimate downside risk at a point in time as the value-at-risk
(VaR) at the 1% quantile.8 VaR represents a cutoff value in the lower left
tail of the distribution indicating that a bank or the banking system will ex-
perience negative equity returns over the upcoming period of VaR or more
extreme with 1% probability. A more negative VaR indicates greater down-
side tail risk as it implies more probability weight over extreme negative
outcomes. We estimate VaR for individual banks and the banking system as
a whole.
We first examine the relation between DELR and VaR for individual
banks, finding that higher DELR is associated with significantly higher risk
of severe drops in equity values during economic downturns. These indi-
vidual bank results bear a relation with research showing that earnings
management is associated with equity crash risk (e.g., Hutton, Marcus,
and Tehranian [2009], Cohen et al. [2014]). These papers build on the
idea that, if firms serially hide bad news, future release of accumulated
buildups of negative information can cause stock price to crash (Jin and
Myers [2006]). Our paper differs from this literature in several fundamen-
tal respects. First, we examine tail risk with respect to the ex ante distribu-
tion over equity returns, where the crash risk literature focuses on ex post
return realizations. Second, the previous literature appeals to the theory of
Jin and Myers [2006] but does not empirically specify the precise account-
ing policies driving buildups of negative information, while we exploit the
7 In regard to capital-induced reductions in bank lending (i.e., a “capital crunch”), an im-
portant empirical issue is distinguishing whether reduced lending results from a reduction in
the supply of bank financing or from reduced demand by borrowers for funding. This is not
a direct concern in our paper. Our focus is on the extent to which DELR in general makes
banks more vulnerable to severe downside risk and risk codependence among banks. This
vulnerability can derive from reduced supply of or demand for bank financing, as well as from
increased risk-shifting, lower probability of survival, etc.
8 Results are robust to estimating VaR at the 5% quantile of the distribution.
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banking setting to isolate an accounting policy choice where banks specif-
ically delay recognition of losses that can accumulate and threaten capital
during future crises. Third, we find that increases in downside tail risk asso-
ciated with DELR are concentrated in periods of economic distress, finding
little difference in downside risk between high and low DELR banks during
good times.
It is also useful to contrast our analysis with Beatty and Liao [2011], who
find that DELR increases the sensitivity of realized loan growth to bank
capital during recessions, suggesting that DELR contributes to a “capital
crunch” where capital concerns cause banks to contract lending. This re-
sult suggests that accounting policy can have a nontrivial impact on the
pro-cyclicality of the supply of bank lending. However, while reduced bank
lending can negatively impact bank-dependent borrowers’ access to financ-
ing, it is not clear what a contraction in lending implies about a bank’s
vulnerability to negative tail risk. Thus, we extend the literature by showing
that DELR significantly increases individual banks’ vulnerability to severe
drops in equity values. Further, while Beatty and Liao [2011] focus on how
DELR conditions the sensitivity of current lending decisions to bank capital,
we find that a bank’s capital level conditions the association between DELR
and downside risk, where this association is significantly higher for banks
with lower regulatory capital levels. Moreover, while increased tail risk vul-
nerability can result from lower lending volumes as well as other potential
negative consequences of DELR, our result is robust to controlling for a
bank’s current loan growth. This suggests that the influence of DELR on
downside risk reflects more than just current reductions in loan growth.
In our final analysis, we extend beyond individual banks to consider how
DELR affects downside risk codependence between individual banks and
the entire banking system. First, to examine how downside risk vulnerabil-
ity of individual banks is influenced by distress of the banking system, we
estimate the VaR of individual banks conditional on the state of the aggregate
banking sector. We find that, during recessions, downside risk of high DELR
banks is relatively more sensitive to the distress of the banking system. That
is, when the banking sector as a whole is suffering from a negative economic
shock, the equity values of high DELR banks become more vulnerable to
severe downside risks. To examine the contribution of individual banks to
systemic risk, we reverse the ordering of conditioning and estimate the VaR
of the aggregate banking system conditional on the VaR of an individual
bank to derive the marginal contribution of an individual bank to system-
wide risk. We find that banks with higher DELR contribute more to the
risk of severe drops in equity values for the aggregate banking sector. Why
does DELR magnify systemic risks? We theorize that downside risk vulnera-
bility at the individual bank level can translate into systemic risk by virtue
of DELR creating a common source of risk vulnerability across many high
DELR banks simultaneously. This common DELR source of risk vulnerability
can then lead to risk codependence among banks and generate systemic ef-
fects from banks acting as part of a herd.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we develop
the conceptual framework underlying our empirical analysis and discuss
related literature. Section 3 contains the empirical analysis of the relation
between DELR and stock market liquidity risk. Section 4 discusses our em-
pirical analysis of how DELR influences the tail risk of individual banks, the
sensitivity of a bank’s tail risk to systemic financial events, and the contribu-
tion of individual banks to systemic risk. Section 5 concludes.
2. Conceptual Framework and Prior Literature
Section 2.1 discusses DELR and how we empirically estimate it for individ-
ual banks. Section 2.2 discusses prior literature on bank transparency and
develops our hypothesis that DELR reflects opportunistic accounting pol-
icy choices by banks. Section 2.3 lays out our empirical approach to inves-
tigating whether DELR reflects bank transparency by examining relations
between DELR and stock market liquidity risk. Finally, section 2.4 develops
the conceptual framework underpinning our empirical analysis of whether
DELR increases the tail risk of individual banks and amplifies systemic risk.
2.1 DELAYED RECOGNITION OF EXPECTED LOAN LOSSES (DELR)
Loan loss provisioning is a key accounting policy choice that directly in-
fluences the volatility and cyclicality of bank earnings, as well as information
properties of banks’ financial reports with respect to reflecting loan portfo-
lios’ risk attributes. While both the Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB) and International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) have long
required use of incurred loss model for loan loss provisioning, the com-
plexity of loan portfolios allows substantial scope for discretion within the
prescribed rules (Financial Stability Forum [2009], Dugan [2009]).9
Conceptually, loan loss provisions and related loan loss reserves can be
viewed as providing a cushion against expected losses while bank capital is a
buffer against unexpected losses (e.g., Laeven and Majnoni [2003]). When
banks opportunistically delay recognition of expected losses, a current ex-
pense is not recorded for some portion of the expected losses. This has
several implications. First, DELR can mask a loan portfolio’s risk attributes
and obscure the true capital cushion by mingling unrecognized expected
losses together with capital available to buffer unexpected losses. Second,
9 The incurred loss model specifies that loan losses are recognized only when a loss is proba-
bly based on past events and conditions existing at the financial statement date. Both the FASB
and IASB have developed new rules for financial instruments that will substantially change the
accounting for loan loss provisions. In general, the new rules drop the incurred loss model and
adopt a more forward-looking “expected loss” model that will require banks to recognize not
only credit losses that have already occurred but also losses that are expected in the future. The
FASB and IASB take different approaches to implementing an expected loss framework. It is
an open question as to whether the new rules will increase or decrease the role of accounting
discretion in loan loss accounting.
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because unrecognized expected losses will be recognized on average in the
future, DELR creates expected loss overhangs that loom over future bank
profits and capital adequacy.
We generate bank-quarter estimates of DELR following Bushman and
Williams [2012], Beatty and Liao [2011], and Nichols, Wahlen, and
Wieland [2009].10 For each bank-quarter, we estimate the following two
equations using a 12-quarter rolling window, requiring the bank to have
data for all 12 quarters:
LLPt = β0 + β1NPLt−1 + β2NPLt−2 + β3Cap italt−1
+ β4EBLLPt + β5Si ze t−1 + εt , (1)
LLPt = β0 + β1NPLt−1 + β2NPLt+2β3NPLt−1 + β4NPLt−2
+β5Cap italt−1 + β6EBLLPt + β7Si ze t−1 + εt . (2)
LLP is loan loss provisions scaled by lagged total loans, NPL is the
change in nonperforming loans scaled by lagged total loans, Capital is the
tier 1 capital ratio, Ebllp is earnings before loan loss provision scaled by
lagged total loans, Size is the natural log of total assets (all variables and their
construction are detailed in the appendix). We include Capital to control
for banks incentives to manage capital through loan loss provisions (Beatty,
Chamberlain, and Magliolo [1995]. Ebllp is included to control for banks’
incentives to smooth earnings (Ahmed, Takeda, and Thomas [1999], Bush-
man and Williams [2012]).
We compute DELR as the incremental R2 calculated by subtracting the
adjusted R2 of equation (1) from that of equation (2). We posit that higher
incremental R2 is consistent with more timely recognition of expected
losses. The idea is that more timely banks recognize loss provisions concur-
rently with increases in NPL and in anticipation of future nonperformance,
while less timely banks delay loss recognition related to contemporaneous
NPL innovations and do not anticipate future nonperformance. Each quar-
ter, we rank banks based on their incremental R2 and set the indicator vari-
able DELR equal to 1 if the bank is below the median incremental R2, and
0 otherwise. That is, DELR = 1 for banks that most aggressively delay loss
recognition. Descriptive statistics for DELR are included in table 1, which is
discussed further in section 3.1.
2.2 DISCRETIONARY LOAN LOSS PROVISIONING BEHAVIOR AND BANK
TRANSPARENCY
It is often asserted that banks are inherently more opaque than nonfi-
nancial firms (Morgan [2002], Flannery, Kwan, and Nimalendran [2004,
10 See Beatty and Liao [2014] for an extensive discussion about empirically modeling loan
loss provisions.
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TA B L E 1
Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Pooled DELR regression and descriptive statistics
Dependent Variable: LLPt
Model NPLt+1 NPLt NPLt-1 NPLt-1 Capitalt-2 EBLLPt Sizet-1
(1) 0.0754∗∗ 0.0686∗∗ 0.0010 −0.0681∗∗∗ 0.0003∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.028) (0.002) (0.025) (0.000)
N 11,008
R 2 0.1268
(2) 0.0660∗∗∗ 0.1679∗∗∗ 0.0702∗∗∗ 0.0492∗∗∗ −0.0001 −0.0254 0.0002∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.022) (0.016) (0.016) (0.002) (0.016) (0.000)
N 11,008
R 2 0.2303
Panel B: Descriptive statistics by DELR partitions
HighDELR LowDELR
Variables Mean Median StdDev Mean Median StdDev
VaR −1.509 −1.319 0.717 −1.480∗∗ −1.309∗ 0.682
Skew −0.144 −0.140 0.168 −0.155∗∗∗ −0.150∗∗∗ 0.163
CoVaRi |s −0.588 −0.488 0.580 −0.564∗∗ −0.472∗∗ 0.554
CoVaRs |i −0.224 −0.192 0.193 −0.207∗∗∗ −0.178∗∗∗ 0.182
Trading 0.003 0.001 0.012 0.002∗∗ 0.000∗∗ 0.012
Commercial 0.147 0.131 0.135 0.146 0.128 0.130
Consumer 0.016 0.000 0.048 0.015 0.000 0.045
Real Estate 0.548 0.664 0.329 0.559∗ 0.669 0.323
Mismatch 0.850 0.867 0.088 0.854∗∗ 0.872∗∗ 0.084
Deposit 1.190 1.136 0.288 1.206∗∗∗ 1.150∗∗∗ 0.287
Revenue Mix 0.837 0.852 0.098 0.839∗ 0.856∗∗ 0.097
Capital 0.107 0.104 0.025 0.108∗∗ 0.105 0.027
βMRKT 0.662 0.573 0.618 0.652 0.558 0.611
σe 0.020 0.016 0.015 0.020 0.015∗ 0.014
Size 7.817 7.553 1.560 7.720∗∗∗ 7.500∗ 1.512
MTB 1.795 1.734 0.754 1.798 1.732 0.733
Illiquid 1.063 0.044 3.427 1.007∗ 0.048 3.156
Return 0.002 −0.008 0.166 0.002 −0.011 0.164
LoanGrowth 0.025 0.019 0.045 0.024 0.019 0.047
Panel A above contains the pooled regression for the sample period 1996–2009. The dependent variable
is loan loss provisions scaled by beginning period loans. NPL is the quarter change in nonperforming
loans scaled by beginning total loans. Capital is the tier 1 capital ratio. EBLLP is earnings before provisions
and taxes scaled by beginning period total loans. Size is the natural log of beginning period total assets.
Standards errors are reported in the parentheses and are clustered by bank and quarter. DELR measures
the incremental explanatory power of current and future changes in nonperforming loans on current loan
loss provisions.
Panel B above contains the descriptive statistics for the sample period 1996–2009. DELR is the
incremental explanatory power of current and future changes in nonperforming loans on current
loan loss provisions. LowDELR contains banks with DELR above the median DELR, and HighDELR re-
flects banks below median. VaR is defined as the one percentile value-at-risk over the quarter, where
the value-at is risk is computed over the market value of equity. The variable Skew is defined as
((VaR50% − VaR1%) − (VaR99% − VaR50%)) / (VaR99% − VaR1%), where the q% in the VaRq% represents
the percentile over which the value-at-risk is computed for the market value of equity. CoVaRi |s(
CoVaRs |i
)
is defined as the sum of the firm’s weekly CoVaRi |s
(
CoVaRs |i
)
over the quarter. Trad-
ing is the ratio of trading account assets to total assets. Commercial is total commercial loans scaled by total
loans outstanding. Consumer is total consumer loans outstanding scaled by total loans outstanding. Real Es-
tate is total real estate loans outstanding scaled by total loans. Mismatch is the maturity mismatch. Deposits is
the banks total deposits scaled by beginning period loans. Revenue Mix is defined as the ratio of noninterest
revenue to total revenue. Capital is the firms tier 1 capital ratio. βMrkt is the firms market beta from a tradi-
tional CAPM. σe is the idiosyncratic volatility in equity returns. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets.
MTB is the market-to-book ratio of the firm. Illiquid is Amihud [2002] measure of illiquidity. Return is the
firm’s market adjusted return over the quarter. LoanGrowth is the percentage change in total loans over the
quarter.
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate the difference across columns is significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively.
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2013]). This inherent lack of transparency is presumed to derive from the
fact that assets on banks’ balance sheets reflect investment decisions based
on private information about borrowers and projects that is not available to
those outside the bank (e.g., Diamond [1984], Boyd and Prescott [1986]).
Trading activities may also make banks relatively more opaque as complex
trading and derivatives portfolios embed risks that are hard to assess and
verify, and trading positions and related risk profiles can be quickly altered
in real time (Morgan [2002], Laeven [2013]). A large theory literature ex-
plores bank transparency. Overall, this literature shows that, while credi-
ble public information about individual banks can enhance the ability of
regulators and market participants to monitor and exert discipline on
banks’ behavior, there are potentially significant endogenous costs associ-
ated with transparency.
Consider positive effects of transparency. Financial accounting informa-
tion plays a fundamental corporate governance role, supporting moni-
toring by boards of directors, outside investors, and regulators and the
exercise of investor rights granted by existing laws (e.g., Bushman and
Smith [2001]). Related to this idea, the banking literature posits that
transparency can promote bank stability by enhancing market discipline
of banks’ risk-taking decisions (e.g., Rochet [1992], Blum [2002], Flan-
nery [2001], Cordella and Yeyati [1998]). Market discipline is a process in
which market participants use available information to monitor and disci-
pline excessive risk-taking by banks. Market discipline can operate by mar-
ket participants directly exerting influence on a bank’s risk-taking behav-
ior. For example, transparency may enhance ex ante discipline as bank
managers anticipate that informed investors will quickly discern increased
risk-taking and demand higher yields on their investments. Market disci-
pline can also operate via regulatory intervention triggered by market sig-
nals, such as price movements of bank securities (e.g., Stephanou [2010],
Flannery [2001]). Further, transparency can limit regulatory forbearance
by providing a basis for market participants to exert pressure on bank
supervisors to promptly intervene in troubled banks (Rochet [2005],
Gallemore [2013]).
Beyond market discipline, transparency can mitigate indiscriminate
panic and rollover risk by reducing depositors’ and other short-term
lenders’ uncertainty about the solvency of individual banks (Ratnovski
[2013], Gorton and Huang [2006]).11 In this vein, Granja [2014] shows
that state-level regulations that required banks to report financial state-
ments in local newspapers during the national banking era are associated
with a reduction in observed bank failures within the state. As discussed
earlier, transparency can reduce financing frictions imposed on banks
seeking to raise capital in response to negative balance sheet shocks. The
11 For example, it has been posited that recent bank liquidity crises were caused by increased
uncertainty over banks’ solvency as assessed by participants in wholesale funding markets
(Shin [2009], Goldsmith-Pinkham and Yorulmazer [2010], Huang and Ratnovski [2011]).
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existence of financing frictions driven by asymmetric information between
bank managers and market participants underpin theories of monetary
policy transmission through a bank lending channel (Kashyap and Stein
[1995, 2000]) and capital crunch theories positing that regulatory capital
concerns cause banks to restrict lending during economic downturns
(Bernanke and Lown [1991], Bolton and Freixas [2006], Van den Heuvel
[2009]).12
On the negative side, theory posits that transparency can lead to ineffi-
cient bank runs driven by coordination failures (Morris and Shin [2002],
Chen and Hasan [2006]), cause reputational contagion where the failure
of one bank causes creditors in other banks to lose confidence in the
bank regulator’s competence (Morrison and White [2013]), adversely af-
fect incentives of bank managers and lead them to make inefficient in-
vestment decisions (Goldstein and Sapra [2013]), restrict interbank risk-
sharing arrangements (Goldstein and Leitner [2013]), and undermine
banks’ ability to produce private money (Gorton [2013], Dang, et al.
[2014]).13
These conflicting views create a demand for empirical research that can
reveal insights into the nature of transparency and when, where, and how it
positively or negatively affects banks and the banking system. A key source
of bank transparency is publicly disclosed financial reports. In this paper,
we explore the possibility that a bank’s accounting policy choices are an
important determinant of its transparency. While the accounting rules
themselves are an important determinant of bank transparency, the
application of accounting rules to specific economic situations often al-
lows substantial scope for judgment to be exercised by privately informed
bank managers. Accounting discretion may create informational benefits
by facilitating the incorporation of private information into accounting re-
ports, but also increases potential for opportunistic accounting behavior by
managers that can degrade bank transparency and lead to negative conse-
quences along other dimensions (Beatty and Liao [2014]).
In this paper, we focus on banks’ accounting discretion over loan loss
provisions as captured by delayed expected loan loss recognition (DELR).
The loan book is typically the largest single asset on a bank’s balance sheet
where the lending activities underlying this portfolio are based on private
information not available to those outside of the bank. Loan loss provisions
12 Granja [2013] suggests another benefit of bank transparency, showing that disclosure
requirements mitigate information asymmetries in the auctions for failed banks. Specifically,
Granja [2013] finds that, when failed banks are subject to more comprehensive disclosure
requirements, regulators incur lower costs of closing a bank and retain a lower portion of
the failed bank’s assets, while bidders that are geographically more distant are more likely to
participate in the bidding for the failed bank.
13 One of the main functions of financial institutions is to create liquidity. An important
form of liquidity creation is where banks issue liabilities that can be used to facilitate payments
and settlement (e.g., demand deposits, sale and repurchase agreements, or other forms of
short-term debt). This is private money.
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are accruals of fundamental importance to bank performance, which, as
estimates of loan losses based on private information, afford management
significant flexibility in making accounting choices that can serve to de-
grade the ability of outsiders to assess a loan portfolio’s true attributes. We
hypothesize that DELR is a manifestation of opportunistic loan provision-
ing behavior that results in reduced bank transparency.14 Of course, trans-
parency is a complex, multidimensional construct and the extent to which
DELR reflects an important aspect of bank transparency is ultimately an em-
pirical question. As discussed next, we provide evidence consistent with this
hypothesis by appealing to a literature that connects a firm’s transparency
and investors’ uncertainty over its fundamentals to properties of the firm’s
stock market illiquidity.
2.3 DELR, TRANSPARENCY, AND STOCK MARKET LIQUIDITY RISK
In general, investors prefer liquid securities as illiquidity is costly (e.g.,
Amihud, Mendelson, and Pedersen [2005]). A stock’s illiquidity level is
in essence a transaction cost imposed on trading. Because investors care
about a stock’s illiquidity at the time they transact, the variability of illiq-
uidity is also important as variability increases uncertainty attached to a po-
sition. Liquidity risk refers to the risk that a stock will become illiquid at
inopportune times for investors. Liquidity risk reflects an aspect of system-
atic risk that is reflected in expected stock returns to compensate investors
for bearing undiversifiable risk. From the standpoint of firms who wish to
raise new equity capital, higher illiquidity levels and liquidity risks represent
financing frictions as they manifest in higher expected stock returns de-
manded by potential investors (Acharya and Petersen [2005]). As discussed
in the introduction, an extensive literature links transparency to stock mar-
ket illiquidity and liquidity risk (e.g., Vayanos [2004], Amihud, Mendelson,
and Pedersen [2005], Brunnermeier and Pedersen [2009], Lang and
Maffet [2011]).
We follow Amihud [2002] and define illiquidity of a stock as the abso-
lute value of daily stock returns divided by daily trading volume in dollars.
Our measure, Illiquidity, is the natural logarithm of average daily illiquidity
over the quarter. We also consider two aspects of liquidity risk. The first as-
pect is co-movement between illiquidity of an individual bank’s stock and
illiquidity of the aggregate banking sector, which imposes risk on investors
as it implies that a bank’s stock becomes illiquid when the overall sector
becomes illiquid. To estimate this aspect of liquidity risk, we regress daily
percentage changes in illiquidity of a bank on daily percentage changes in
illiquidity for a value-weighted portfolio of the rest of the banking sector
over the quarter (excluding the individual bank). We require an individual
14 Bushman, Hendricks, and Williams [2014] and Dou, Ryan and Zou [2014] provide evi-
dence that DELR responds to time-varying performance pressures on bank managers, finding
that DELR increases in response to increases in bank competition.
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bank to have a minimum of 50 valid trading days during the quarter. Liquid-
ity risk associated with co-movement of bank level liquidity and aggregate
illiquidity, βBL,AL, is the bank-quarter coefficient on changes in aggregate
illiquidity.
The second aspect of liquidity risk is the co-movement between individ-
ual stock illiquidity and aggregate banking sector stock returns, which cap-
tures the extent to which a stock becomes illiquid when the market is down
and investors especially value the ability to sell easily. We regress daily per-
centage changes in illiquidity of the bank on daily stock returns for a value-
weighted portfolio of the rest of the banking sector over the quarter (ex-
cluding the individual bank).15 Liquidity risk associated with co-movement
of bank level illiquidity and bank market return, βBL,MR, is the bank-quarter
coefficient on banking sector returns.
Consistent with higher DELR reflecting lower bank transparency, we pre-
dict that Illiquidity, βBL,AL and βBL,MR will be higher for high DELR firms,
especially during recessions.
2.4 DELR, DOWNSIDE RISK OF INDIVIDUAL BANKS, AND SYSTEMIC RISK
Two fundamental approaches to bank regulation can be distinguished: a
micro-prudential and a macro-prudential approach. A micro-prudential ap-
proach is aimed at preventing the costly failure of individual banks, where
a macro-prudential approach seeks to safeguard the financial system as
a whole (Hanson, Kashyap, and Stein [2011]). Our analyses contain ele-
ments of both perspectives. We examine the relation between DELR and
vulnerability of individual banks to downside risk, as well as the extent to
which DELR conditions the level of risk codependence among banks. As
discussed previously, DELR, operating both through expected loss overhangs
and reduced transparency, can create capital inadequacy concerns that in-
crease the vulnerability to severe downside risk of individual banks and of
the banking system as a whole. The challenge is to devise a research de-
sign powerful enough to explore connections between DELR and bank and
banking system vulnerability to severe downside risk.
To investigate downside risk, we follow the approach developed by
Adrian and Brunnermeier [2011] and estimate conditional, time-varying
distributions over future equity returns. We then investigate how DELR im-
pacts the lower tail of this distribution. We capture tail risk using a value-
at-risk (VaR) construct. VaR measures the potential loss in value of a risky
asset or portfolio over a defined period for a given confidence interval.
Thus, if the VaR of a bank’s equity returns is –15% at a one-week, 99% con-
fidence level, there is a only a 1% chance that the bank’s equity value will
drop more than 15% over any given week. Formally, let X represent the
15 In our empirical analyses we estimate liquidity risk by reference to the illiquidity and
returns of the aggregate banking sector. All results are robust to using the overall stock market
as our reference portfolio.
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percentage change in the market value of equity for a bank. Then VaR at a
1% probability threshold is defined implicitly as
p r obabili t y (X ≤ VaR) = 1%.
We use quantile regression to estimate time-varying VaRs. With quantile
regression, the predicted value for a given quantile can be interpreted as
the expected outcome at the given quantile, making it straightforward to
estimate time-varying VaR at any quantile. Given our focus on severe down-
side events, VaR at a 1% probability threshold is a negative number indi-
cating with 1% probability that the realization of random variable X will be
VaR or more extreme over a given time horizon. The more negative is VaR,
the larger is the potential drop in the market value of a bank’s equity at a
fixed 1% probability. Holding the probability of loss constant across banks,
estimated VaRs allow us to assess relative downside risk across banks. We
hypothesize that, relative to low DELR banks, high DELR banks will exhibit
significantly higher increases in risk of severe drops in the market value of
a bank’s equity during recessions (i.e., more negative VaR).
We also examine the association between DELR and systemic risk. Follow-
ing the recent financial crisis, there has been considerable interest in mod-
eling and measuring systemic risk. There is no agreed upon approach to
this measurement (e.g., Bisias et al. [2012] Hansen [2014]). One important
stream of literature exploits the high-frequency observability of bank’s eq-
uity prices to extract measures of systemic risk. Some papers in this stream
use contingent claims analysis (e.g., Gray, Merton, and Bodie [2008], Gray
and Jobst [2009]), while others focus on codependence in the tails of eq-
uity returns using reduced form approaches (Acharya et al. [2010], Adrian
and Brunnermeier [2011]).16 Given that equity prices impound the mar-
ket’s expectations about banks’ future prospects, equity-based measures of
bank tail risk reflect risk assessments deriving from a wide range of un-
derlying sources of vulnerability. The focus on equity value is also valuable
because it reflects the market’s expectations about a bank’s (the banking
system’s) capital level. For example, Acharya et al. [2010] use equity values
to estimate a financial institution’s contribution to systemic risk by mea-
suring its propensity to be undercapitalized when the system as a whole is
undercapitalized, empirically showing that their measure possesses substan-
tial power for predicting emerging risks during the financial crisis of 2007–
2009.
We adopt the conditional VaR approach (i.e., CoVaR) developed by
Adrian and Brunnermeier [2011]. In this approach, codependence is cap-
tured by using quantile regression to estimate the VaR of the entire bank-
ing system conditional on the VaR of an individual bank, and by reversing
16 Correlation is a measure of linear codependence, where the term codependence encom-
passes a wider range of relations that can exist between random variables. For example, the
tail dependence of a pair of random variables describes their co-movements in the tails of the
distributions.
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the order of conditioning to also estimate VaR of the individual bank condi-
tional on the VaR of the banking system. Adrian and Brunnermeier [2011]
demonstrate that these two measures of codependence are not symmet-
ric, implying that each measure captures a distinct aspect of a bank’s risk
profile.
To implement our first analysis of the relation between DELR and
banking system–wide outcomes, we estimate the VaR of each individual
bank conditional on the state of the banking system. Specifically, we de-
fine CoVaRi |s y s tem as VaRi of bank i at a 1% probability threshold con-
ditional on the VaRsystem of the entire banking system. The difference
between CoVaRi |s y s tem conditional on the banking system being in distress
(e.g., system outcome = VaRsys temq=1% ) and CoVaRi |s y s tem conditional on the
median state of the banking system (VaRsys temq=50%), CoVaR
i |s y s tem , captures
the marginal contribution of the banking system to downside risk of bank
i. We predict that CoVaRi |s y s tem will decrease more (become more nega-
tive) during recessions for banks with higher levels of DELR.
Finally, to examine how DELR impacts the contribution of individ-
ual banks to systemic risk, we estimate the VaRsystem of the banking system
conditional on the state of individual bank i. We define CoVaRsys tem|i as
VaRsys tem1% of the banking system conditional on the state of bank i. In this
case, the difference between CoVaRsys tem|i conditional on bank i being in
distress (e.g., bank i outcome = VaRiq=1%) and CoVaRsys tem|i conditional on
the median state of bank i (bank i outcome = VaRiq=50%), CoVaRsys tem|i ,
captures the marginal contribution of bank i to the risk that the banking
system will experience a severe drop in the aggregate market value of equity
or total assets. We predict that CoVaRsys tem|i will decrease more (become
more negative) during recessions for banks with higher levels of DELR.
As stressed by Adrian and Brunnermeier [2011], CoVaRsys tem|i cap-
tures both causal contributions of an individual bank to systemic risk (e.g.,
distress at large, interconnected banks directly causing negative spillover
effects on others) and contributions driven by herd reactions to a com-
mon factor. In isolation, DELR is an idiosyncratic decision of an individ-
ual bank responding to some sort of performance pressure. It is not obvi-
ous whether, and if so how, the accounting decisions of an individual bank
could amplify the bank’s influence on the risk of a severe downside hit to
the entire banking system.We theorize that, when a group of banks who, for
idiosyncratic reasons, all significantly delay loss recognition in good times,
all group members will simultaneously face the consequences of loss over-
hangs and financing frictions correlated during a downturn. As a result,
the codependence of tail risks among such banks will be significant, cre-
ating a systemic effect from banks acting as part of a herd (Brunnermeier
et al. [2009]). That is, DELR acts like a systematic risk factor that inflicts a
negative shock on the entire group of DELR banks, thereby inflicting mea-
surable pain on the entire banking system.
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3. DELR and Equity Financing Frictions: Data, Methodology, and
Results
3.1 DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Our quarterly data come primarily from Compustat, Bank Call reports,
and CRSP. Our sample starts in 1993 and goes until the end of 2009.17
To ensure that mergers and acquisitions do not impact our results, we
eliminate observations that had any M&A activity over a given quarter. We
measure economic cycles using NBER dates to define recessionary periods
(“Bust”) and nonrecessionary (“Boom”) periods. There are two recession-
ary periods in our sample, March 2001 to November 2002, and December
2007 to June 2009.
Earlier, we developed our bank-quarter measure of DELR as the incre-
mental R2 in explaining variation in current loan loss provisions from
adding current and future changes in nonperforming loans over and above
lagged changes in nonperforming loans. In table 1, panel A, we illustrate
the DELR estimation by reporting equations (1) and (2) estimated for
the pooled sample of all bank-quarter observations. We see that the differ-
ence in R2 between (2) and (1) for this pooled sample equals 0.103 (0.230 –
0.127). Also noteworthy in the pooled regression is that the coefficients on
all NPL variables are positive and significant, and that the coefficient on
NPLt is much larger than the coefficient on NPLt+1. When we estimate
DELR for individual bank quarters, we see that DELR has mean (median)
value of 0.167 (0.114) and exhibits significant cross-sectional variation with
a standard deviation of 0.162, 0.045 at the 25th percentile and 0.237 at the
75th percentile.
Table 1, panel B, splits the sample into high and low DELR partitions and
examines how the key bank level control variables used in our regression
analyses differ across groups. This variable set consists of the following (all
variables are described in detail in the appendix). Trading, defined as the
ratio of the trading portfolio to total assets, controls for differences in the
composition of banks’ securities portfolios. Securities classified as trading
are accounted for using fair value accounting, with gains or losses from
value changes included in net income. We control for the composition of
the loan portfolio with Commercial, Consumer, and Real Estate, which repre-
sent commercial, consumer, and real estate loans, respectively, all scaled by
total loans. Mismatch, defined as short-term liabilities net of cash divided
by total liabilities, controls for differences in funding risk associated with
short-term debt. To complete our balance sheet controls, we include De-
posits, defined as total deposits scaled by lagged total loans, and Capital, the
tier 1 capital ratio.
17 Bank Compustat does not report quarterly nonperforming levels prior to 1993. Due to
the data demands for estimating DELR using 12-quarter rolling windows, our analysis spans
the period 1996–2009.
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To control for differences in revenue mix, we include Revenue Mix,
the ratio of noninterest revenue to total revenue.18 We include two eq-
uity risk measures, σ e, the standard deviation of daily equity returns
over the quarter, and βMrkt , the bank’s market beta from a traditional
CAPM model estimated on daily returns over the prior quarter. We in-
clude the bank’s stock return, Return, to control for the information
set that bank managers’ have for determining loan loss provisions. In
terms of the manager’s information set, we note that equity return volatil-
ity also proxies for information flows to the market. We also include
LoanGrowth, defined as the percentage change in loans on the balance
sheet over the quarter, as loan growth has been posited to be an impor-
tant driver of the riskiness of banks (Foos, Norden, and Weber [2010]).
Finally, we control for Size with the log of total assets, and market-
to-book (MTB) as a control for expected growth differences. Table 1,
panel B, reveals that many of the control variables differ significantly across
the low and high DELR groups, further justifying their inclusion in the
analysis.
3.2 DELR, LIQUIDITY RISK, AND ILLIQUIDITY
As described above, we follow Amihud [2002] and define illiquidity of a
stock as the absolute value of daily stock returns divided by daily trading
volume in dollars. Liquidity risk reflects how closely bank-level stock mar-
ket illiquidity co-moves with aggregate banking sector illiquidity (βBL,AL)
and market return (βBL,MR). To estimate liquidity risk, we regress daily per-
cent changes in illiquidity of a bank on daily percent changes in illiquidity
(market returns) for a value-weighted portfolio of the rest of the banking
sector over the quarter (excluding the individual bank). To the extent that
DELR reflects bank transparency, we expect illiquidity and liquidity risk to
increase with the extent of DELR, and that this association will be stronger
during crisis periods. To examine the effects of DELR on our proxies for
a bank’s liquidity risk (βBL,AL, βBL,MR) and illiquidity level (Illiquidity), we
estimate the following OLS pooled regressions with year fixed effects, clus-
tering the standard errors by both calendar quarter and bank to correct for
possible time-series and cross-sectional correlation:
βBL,AL,t(βBL,MR,t,I lliquidit yt) = δ0 + δ1DELRt−1
+ Contr ols +Year F E + εt . (3)
We estimate equation (3) for three samples: (1) pooled, (2) “boom” sub-
sample, and (3) “bust” subsample (i.e., quarters designated by NBER as re-
cessions). As controls we include the following which were defined earlier
18 Brunnermeier, Dong, and Palia [2012] find that a bank’s contribution to system-wide risk
is increasing in the extent to which it relies on noninterest revenue (i.e., Revenue Mix). Given
that we control for Revenue Mix, the effects of DELR we document in our CoVaRsys tem|i are
orthogonal to the effects documented in Brunnermeier, Dong, and Palia [2012].
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and in the appendix: Trading, Commercial, Consumer, Real Estate, Mismatch,
Deposits, Revenue Mix, Capital, βMrkt , σ e, Size, MTB, and LoanGrowth.
Table 2, panel A, reports the results for βBL,AL. In the pooled analysis, we
find a positive relation between DELR and βBL,AL (0.0364, significant at the
10% level). Moving to the boom and bust subsamples, we find a positive and
significant relation between DELR and βBL,AL in the “bust” subsample, but
not the “boom” sample. The reported coefficient for DELR in bust periods
is 0.1288 (p-value < 0.01). Importantly, the positive coefficient in the “bust”
period is significantly different from the coefficient in the “boom” period
at the 0.01 level.
In table 2, panel B, we find similar results for βBL,MR. Specifically, we find
a positive coefficient on DELR (coefficient = 0.0034, p-value< 0.05) for
the bust subsample and insignificant coefficient for the boom subsample.
Overall, across the two different proxies for liquidity risk, we find evidence
that liquidity co-movement is significantly higher for high DELR banks rel-
ative to low DELR banks, and this effect is concentrated in recessionary
periods.
Table 2, panel C, reports the result for illiquidity levels. In the pooled
analysis, we find a positive relation between DELR and Illiquidity (0.2175,
significant at the 10% level). When we turn to the subsamples, similar to the
liquidity risk results, there is a positive and significant relationship between
DELR and Illiquidity in the bust subsample, but not the boom sample. The
reported coefficient for DELR in busts is 0.6421 (significant at the 5% level).
Further, the positive coefficient in the bust period is significantly different
from the coefficient in the boom period at the 0.05 level, consistent with
illiquidity being relatively higher for high DELR banks during recessions.
Consistent with DELR reducing bank transparency and increasing in-
vestor uncertainty about bank fundamentals, we find that DELR is asso-
ciated with higher illiquidity levels and liquidity risks during recessions.
Higher illiquidity levels and liquidity risks imply higher equity financing
costs, which can impede access to new equity financing needed to replenish
capital depleted by recessionary losses. Further, increased co-movement be-
tween bank-level illiquidity and banking sector illiquidity and returns sug-
gests that high DELR banks as a group may simultaneously face elevated
financing frictions and enhanced opportunities to engage in risk-shifting
behavior in crisis periods.
4. DELR and Downside Risk
The previous section provides evidence consistent with DELR reducing
bank transparency as manifested in greater financing frictions. In this sec-
tion, we examine whether DELR is associated with increased vulnerability
of banks to downside tail risks. We posit that the contribution of DELR
to increased downside vulnerability is driven by direct consequences of
bank transparency and loss overhangs, as well as significant interactions
between the two. In terms of interaction effects, there are a number of
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TA B L E 2
DELR, Illiquidity Level, and Liquidity Risk
Panel A: Liquidity risk: Co-movement of bank level illiquidity with aggregate illiquidity
Dependent Variable: βBL,AL
Variables Predictions Pooled Boom Bust
DELRt-1 + 0.0364∗ 0.0119 0.1288∗∗∗
(0.0228) (0.0166) (0.0539)†††
Tradingt-1 1.1023 1.9066∗∗ −2.9925
(0.8760) (0.7850) (3.5654)
Commercialt-1 0.0472 −0.1057∗ 0.4982∗
(0.1018) (0.0610) (0.2780)
Consumert-1 −0.7804∗∗∗ −0.2711 −1.6661∗∗∗
(0.2234) (0.2362) (0.2920)
Real Estatet-1 0.0793 0.0676 0.0934
(0.0600) (0.0423) (0.2052)
Mismatcht-1 −0.1223 0.0495 −0.7837∗∗
(0.1198) (0.0747) (0.3811)
Depositst-1 0.0046 −0.0455 0.2380∗∗∗
(0.0335) (0.0283) (0.0648)
Revenue Mixt-1 −0.0768∗ 0.0508 −0.7789∗∗
(0.0458) (0.1013) (0.3372)
Capitalt-1 −0.0021 0.1339 0.1421
(0.6380) (0.4518) (1.3868)
βMrkt 0.0078 0.0013 0.0114
(0.0135) (0.0144) (0.0290)
σe ,t−1 0.8825 0.5223 0.5657
(1.1986) (1.3322) (2.2223)
Sizet-1 0.0249∗ 0.0206 0.0538
(0.0144) (0.0161) (0.0374)
MTBt-1 0.0033 0.0097 −0.0572
(0.0143) (0.0164) (0.0628)
LoanGrowtht-1 0.0857 0.1202 −0.3161
(0.2766) (0.2192) (0.9763)
Fixed Effect Year Year Year
N 7,883 6,168 1,715
Adj R 2 0.0172 0.0193 0.0306
Panel B: Liquidity risk: Co-movement of bank level illiquidity with market returns
Dependent Variable: βBL,MR
Variables Prediction Pooled Boom Bust
DELRt-1 + 0.0013 0.0005 0.0034∗∗
(0.0028) (0.0040) (0.0016)††
Tradingt-1 −0.0031 0.0259 −0.0746
(0.0591) (0.0834) (0.0756)
Commercialt-1 −0.0095 −0.0183 0.0155
(0.0107) (0.0113) (0.0094)
Consumert-1 0.0685∗∗ 0.0900 0.0527
(0.0345) (0.0612) (0.0390)
Real Estatet-1 0.0048 −0.0056 0.0398∗
(0.0112) (0.0076) (0.0206)
Mismatcht-1 −0.0004 0.0142 −0.0575∗
(0.0120) (0.0123) (0.0336)
Depositst-1 0.0196 0.0177 0.0254
(0.0157) (0.0195) (0.0218)
(Continued)
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Panel B: Liquidity risk: Co-movement of bank level illiquidity with market returns
Dependent Variable: βBL,MR
Variables Prediction Pooled Boom Bust
Revenue Mixt-1 −0.0084∗ −0.0136∗ 0.0045
(0.0043) (0.0074) (0.0150)
Capitalt-1 −0.1557 −0.0719 −0.3788
(0.1102) (0.0975) (0.3071)
βMrkt 0.0007 −0.0019 0.0094∗∗∗
(0.0035) (0.0025) (0.0030)
σe ,t−1 −0.2100∗∗ −0.0707 −0.4279∗∗∗
(0.1063) (0.2674) (0.1192)
Sizet-1 −0.0005 −0.0003 −0.0017
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0012)
MTBt-1 −0.0025 −0.0009 −0.0073
(0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0045)
LoanGrowtht-1 −0.0102 −0.0064 −0.0162
(0.0315) (0.0309) (0.0354)
Fixed Effects Year Year Year
N 7,883 6,168 1,715
Adj R 2 0.0034 0.0034 0.0126
Panel C: Illiquidity level
Dependent Variable: Illiquidity
Variables Prediction Pooled Boom Bust
DELRt-1 + 0.2175∗ 0.0376 0.6421∗∗
(0.1258) (0.0953) (0.3313)††
Tradingt-1 −31.3215∗∗∗ −26.3751∗∗∗ −30.5435∗∗
(8.9759) (9.0888) (13.7935)
Commercialt-1 1.0492∗ 0.7732 1.7338∗
(0.6049) (0.5803) (1.0233)
Consumert-1 9.4837∗∗∗ 6.7611∗ 7.0400∗
(3.6120) (3.5574) (3.9744)
Real Estatet-1 1.2225∗∗∗ 1.1418∗∗∗ 1.5164∗∗
(0.4071) (0.4324) (0.6634)
Mismatcht-1 1.4418 1.2000 2.9349
(1.1317) (0.9821) (2.8214)
Depositst-1 −0.6948 −0.5685 −1.8668∗
(0.5316) (0.4548) (1.0225)
Revenue Mixt-1 2.6508∗∗ 1.1855 2.8435
(1.2411) (0.8407) (1.9664)
Capitalt-1 0.2261 0.7423 9.2229
(4.2452) (3.9565) (7.6438)
βMrkt 1.5268∗∗∗ 1.1705∗∗∗ 2.9314∗∗∗
(0.2542) (0.2055) (0.4928)
σe ,t−1 −71.2991∗∗∗ −72.8816∗∗∗ −64.9737∗∗∗
(12.7354) (19.0261) (12.6813)
Sizet-1 0.4873∗∗∗ 0.3817∗∗∗ 0.5601∗∗
(0.0976) (0.0790) (0.2199)
MTBt-1 0.0266 0.0725 −0.0672
(0.1000) (0.0807) (0.1883)
LoanGrowtht-1 3.0178∗∗ 2.9277∗∗∗ 5.9590∗∗
(Continued)
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(1.1878) (1.1303) (2.9500)
Fixed Effects Year Year Year
N 9,232 6,936 1,932
Adj R 2 0.1815 0.1759 0.2333
Panel A reports OLS pooled regressions over the time period 1996–2009. The dependent variable is
βBL,AL, defined as the coefficient from a regression of changes in firm illiquidity on changes in bank sector
illiquidity estimated over the quarter. DELR (i.e., less timely banks) is an indicator variable set equal to 1
if a bank’s DELR is below the median DELR, and zero otherwise. Trading is the ratio of trading account
assets to total assets. Commercial is total commercial loans scaled by total loans outstanding. Consumer is
total consumer loans outstanding scaled by total loans outstanding. Real Estate is total real estate loans
outstanding scaled by total loans. Mismatch is the maturity mismatch. Deposits is the banks total deposits
scaled by beginning period loans. Revenue Mix is defined as the ratio of noninterest revenue to total revenue.
Capital is the firms tier 1 capital ratio. βMrkt is the firms market beta from a traditional CAPM. σe is the
idiosyncratic volatility in equity returns. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. MTB is the market-to-
book ratio of the firm. LoanGrowth is the percentage change in total loans over the quarter. Bust years are
defined using the NBER dates for recessionary periods. Year-fixed effects are included in all regressions and
standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered by both bank and calendar quarter.
Panel B reports OLS pooled regressions over the time period 1996–2009. The dependent variable is
βBL,MR, defined as the coefficient from a regression of changes in firm illiquidity on the bank sector return
estimated over the quarter. DELR (i.e., less timely banks) is an indicator variable set equal to 1 if a bank’s
DELR is below the median DELR, and zero otherwise. Trading is the ratio of trading account assets to total
assets. Commercial is total commercial loans scaled by total loans outstanding. Consumer is total consumer
loans outstanding scaled by total loans outstanding. Real Estate is total real estate loans outstanding scaled
by total loans. Mismatch is the maturity mismatch. Deposits is the banks total deposits scaled by beginning
period loans. Revenue Mix is defined as the ratio of noninterest revenue to total revenue. Capital is the firms
tier 1 capital ratio. βMrkt is the firms market beta from a traditional CAPM. σe is the idiosyncratic volatility
in equity returns. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. MTB is the market-to-book ratio of the firm.
LoanGrowth is the percentage change in total loans over the quarter. Bust years are defined using the NBER
dates for recessionary periods. Year-fixed effects are included in all regressions and standard errors are
reported in parentheses and are clustered by both bank and calendar quarter.
Panel C reports OLS pooled regressions over the time period 1996–2009. The dependent variable is
Illiquidity. Illiquidity is defined as log of illiquidity (Amihud [2002]). DELR (i.e., less timely banks) is an
indicator variable set equal to 1 if a bank’s DELR is below the median DELR, and zero otherwise. Trading is
the ratio of trading account assets to total assets. Commercial is total commercial loans scaled by total loans
outstanding. Consumer is total consumer loans outstanding scaled by total loans outstanding. Real Estate is
total real estate loans outstanding scaled by total loans. Mismatch is the maturity mismatch. Deposits is the
banks total deposits scaled by beginning period loans. Revenue Mix is defined as the ratio of noninterest
revenue to total revenue. Capital is the firms tier 1 capital ratio. βMrkt is the firms market beta from a
traditional CAPM. σe is the idiosyncratic volatility in equity returns. Size is the natural logarithm of total
assets. MTB is the market-to-book ratio of the firm. LoanGrowth is the percentage change in total loans over
the quarter. Bust years are defined using the NBER dates for recessionary periods. Year-fixed effects are
included in all regressions and standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered by both bank
and calendar quarter.
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively.
†††, ††, † indicate that the difference between boom and bust coefficients are significant at the 0.01, 0.05,
and 0.10, respectively.
ways that capital adequacy concerns driven by loss overhangs could inter-
act with transparency to increase banks’ susceptibility to downside risk. For
example, DELR could threaten capital adequacy via loss overhangs while
simultaneously inhibiting new financing by degrading transparency and
increasing financing frictions. It is also plausible that DELR could threaten
capital adequacy via loss overhangs and thus increase banks’ incentives
to engage in risk-shifting, while simultaneously weakening market disci-
pline over risk-taking by reducing transparency. While associations between
DELR and loss overhang, financing frictions, and risk-shifting have been
empirically documented, disentangling precisely how these forces combine
532 R. M. BUSHMAN AND C. D. WILLIAMS
to influence downside risk is beyond the scope of our paper.19 However, in
section 4.3 below, we do investigate if the impact of DELR on downside risk
is a function of capital inadequacy concerns by examining the extent to
which the association between DELR and risk is higher for firms with low
capital levels.
In this section we investigate the relation between DELR and future down-
side risk at the individual bank level (section 4.1), how DELR impacts the
sensitivity of individual banks’ downside risk to system distress (section 4.2),
the extent to which a bank’s tier-1 capital level conditions the relation be-
tween DELR and downside risk of individual banks (section 4.3), and, fi-
nally, how DELR affects the contribution of individual banks to systemic risk
(section 4.4).
4.1 DELR AND INDIVIDUAL BANKS’ DOWNSIDE TAIL RISK
We capture tail risk using estimated value-at-risk (VaR) at the 1% quan-
tile. VaR measures the potential loss in value of a risky asset or portfolio
over a defined period for a given confidence interval. Following Adrian
and Brunnermier [2011], we use quantile regression to estimate time vary-
ing VaRs. With quantile regression, the predicted value for a given quantile
(q%) can be interpreted as the expected outcome at the given quantile,
making it straightforward to estimate time-varying VaR at any quantile.
We measure downside risk with respect to the distribution over changes
in the market values of a bank’s equity (i.e., equity returns). To compute
time-varying VaR at the q-percentile, we first estimate the following quan-
tile regression over the bank’s full weekly time series of equity returns (X),
requiring a minimum of 260 observations:
Xit = αi + βiMt−1 + εi t . (4)
M in (4) is a vector of macro state variables including: (1) VIX, which
captures the implied volatility of the S&P 500 reported by the CBOE; (2)
Liquidity Spread, defined as the difference between the three-month gen-
eral collateral repo rate and the three-month bill rate. Liquidity Spread is a
proxy for short-term liquidity risk in market. We obtain the repo rates from
Bloomberg and the bill rates from the Federal Bank of New York; (3) The
change in the three-month T-Bill rate (3T-Bill), as it predicts the tails of
the distribution better in the financial sector than the level; (4)Yield Curve
Slope, measured as the yield spread between the 10-year Treasury rate and
the three-month rate; (5) Credit Spread, defined as change in the spread
between BAA-rated bonds and the Treasury rate with the same 10-year
19 In an earlier version of this paper, we document that DELR is associated with the existence
of loss overhang, and that the impact of overhang on recognized loan losses is magnified dur-
ing downturns. As discussed earlier, we provide evidence that DELR is associated with higher
financing frictions. Bushman and Williams [2012] show that DELR is associated with increased
risk-shifting behavior and that this behavior is more pronounced for banks with lower capital
levels.
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maturity; (6) The weekly value weighted equity market return (RetMrkt);
and (7) the weekly real estate (SIC code 65–66) sector return in excess
of the market return (RetEstate). The three-month T-Bill, 10-year Treasury,
and spread between BAA-rated bonds and Treasuries are obtained from
the Federal Reserve.20 The market returns are from CRSP.
Conditional weekly time-varying VaR at the q-percentile is computed as
follows, where the coefficients are the estimates from equation (4), and M
are the realized values of the macro-conditioning variables at t−1:
VaRiq%,t = αˆi + βˆ iMt−1. (5)
Finally, we roll the weekly estimated values of VaR into bank-quarter mea-
sures by summing the quarter’s weekly VaR estimates. Our fundamental
measure of the downside risk of the market value of equity is VaRmeasured
at the 1st percentile. More negative values of VaR indicate greater downside
risk.
As a secondary statistic of the shape of the future distribution over
changes in the market value of equity, we also estimate the skewness, Skew,
computed as:
Skew = ((VaR50% − VaR1%) − (VaR99% − VaR50%))
(VaR99% − VaR1%) , (6)
where again VaRq% is the VaR estimate from equation (5) at the qth per-
centile. Skew captures the relative differences in the length of the left and
right tail of the distribution. Positive (negative) values of Skew indicate that
the left of tail the distribution is longer (shorter) than the right tail.
We estimate the effects of DELR on the downside risk of the individual
bank using the following specification:
VaRt(Skewt) = δ0 + δ1DELRt−1 + Contr ols + F E + εt , (7)
where our downside risk measures are VaR and Skew. As controls we include
the following which were defined earlier and in the appendix: Trading, Com-
mercial, Consumer, Real Estate, Mismatch, Deposits, Revenue Mix, Capital, βMrkt ,
σ e, Size, MTB, Illiquid, Return, LoanGrowth. We also include the unemploy-
ment rate, %UnEmploy, and time fixed effects.
Table 3 reports results from estimating (7) in a pooled OLS regression,
and separately for boom and bust periods. Focusing first on VaR, the coef-
ficient on DELR in the pooled regression is –0.0435 with a p-value < 0.05,
indicating that high DELR banks for the same 1% probability expect a rela-
tively larger decrease in the market value of equity than do low DELR banks.
20 These macro variables, M, serve as time-varying conditioning variables conjectured to
shift the conditional mean and the conditional volatility of the risk measures. Note that differ-
ent firms can load on these risk factors in different directions, so that particular correlations
of the risk measures across firms or correlations of the different risk measures for the same
firm are not imposed by construction (Adrian and Brunnermeier [2011]).
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Next we estimate the effect of DELR on downside risk separately for bust pe-
riods (i.e., NBER-defined recession quarters) and boom periods (i.e., non-
recession quarters). In table 3, column 3, we see that, for the boom pe-
riod, the coefficient on DELR (0.034) is not statistically different from zero.
However, for the bust period (column 4), the DELR coefficient (–0.0823)
is statistically significant (p-value < 0.05). Further, the difference in the co-
efficients across boom and bust periods is significantly different (p-value <
0.05), consistent with the effects of DELR on individual banks’ downside
risk being greater during bust periods compared to boom periods.
We find similar results for Skew. In table 3, column 5, the coefficient on
DELR is 0.0100 (p-value < 0.05), indicating that high DELR banks have
more left-skewed distributions compared to low DELR banks. In table 3,
column 6, we see that the boom period coefficient on DELR (0.0059) is not
statistically different from zero, while the bust period coefficient (0.0273)
is statistically significant (p-value < 0.01). Further, columns 6 and 7 reveal
that the DELR effect is concentrated in the bust period and significantly
different from the boom period coefficient (p-value < 0.01).
Taken together, the results in table 3 show that higher DELR is associated
with significantly higher downside risk and that the effect is concentrated
in recessionary periods. We find that high DELR banks exhibit significantly
greater tail risk than low DELR banks in bust periods, but find no differ-
ence between high and low DELR banks in boom periods. These analyses
complement and extend the results in Beatty and Liao [2011] showing that
DELR leads banks to curtail lending during recessions by establishing a sig-
nificant association between DELR and tail risk vulnerability of individual
banks. Further, the analyses in table 3 control for realized loan growth mea-
sured contemporaneously with DELR. Thus, the coefficient on DELR only
reflects aspects of DELR that are orthogonal to loan growth. This suggests
that the influence of DELR on downside risk reflects more than just short-
term reductions in loan growth. Disentangling these effects is a potentially
interesting avenue for future research
4.2 SENSITIVITY OF INDIVIDUAL BANK’S DOWNSIDE RISK TO SYSTEM
DISTRESS (CoVaRI |SY ST EM)
We next examine whether DELR increases the sensitivity of an individual
bank’s downside risk to distress of the entire banking system. To implement
this analysis, we estimate the VaR of each individual bank conditional on the
banking system being in distress and also conditional on the system at its
normal state. Specifically, we define CoVaRsys tem|i as VaR of bank i conditional
on the state of the banking system, and estimate the following two quantile
regressions:
X sys temt = γ s1 + γ s2Mt−1 + εs y s temt , (8)
X it = αi |s y s tem + δi |s y s temX sys temt + β i |s y s temMt−1 + εit . (9)
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Here, Xi is bank i’s weekly stock return, Xsystem is the value-weighted
return from the portfolio of all banks in the economy (excluding bank i),
and M is the vector of macro-conditioning variables defined above. Equa-
tion (8) is analogous to equation (4), except now we are computing a time-
varying VaR for the aggregate banking system. Equation (9) extends equa-
tion (4) by conditioning on equity returns of the banking system (Xsystem).
We estimate (8) and (9), where (8) is estimated at both q% = 1% and
50%, and (9) at q% = 1%. Using the predicted values from (8) and (9), we
specify
VaRsys temq%,t = γˆ s1 + γˆ s2Mt−1, (10)
CoVaRi |s y s tem1%,t = αˆi |s y s tem + δˆi |s y s temVaRsys tem1%or 50%,t + βˆ i |s y s temMt−1. (11)
CoVaRi |s y s tem1%,t , equation (11), is bank i’s time t VaR at q%= 1%, conditional
on the VaR of the banking system being at either the 1% or 50% quantile.
To capture the sensitivity of bank i’s conditional VaR1% to system-wide fi-
nancial turmoil, we compute
CoVaRi |s y s temt = CoVaRi |s y s tem=VaR1%t − CoVaRi |s y s tem=VaR50%t (12)
= αˆi |s y s tem + δˆi |s y s tem
(
VaRsys tem1%,t − VaRsys tem50%,t
)
+ βˆ i |s y s temMt−1.
CoVaRi |s y s tem captures the marginal contribution of the banking system to
the downside risk of bank i. Following Adrian and Brunnermeier [2011], we
sum the weekly CoVaRi |s y s tem to a quarterly measure. More negative values
of CoVaRi |s y s tem indicate that the bank’s downside risk is more affected by
the system moving from “normal” to “distressed” states, suggesting that an
individual bank is more vulnerable to system-wide events.
Table 4, column 2, reports a DELR coefficient of −0.0138 in a pooled
specification, where this coefficient is not statistically different from zero.
However, when we split between boom and bust periods, we find that the
expected downside risk of high DELR banks is more vulnerable to systemic
events during economic downturns. Specifically, in table 4, the DELR coef-
ficient in the bust period is –0.0609 and statistically significant (p-value <
0.05), while for the boom periods the DELR coefficient is –0.0025 and statis-
tically insignificant. Moreover, the bust period coefficients are significantly
larger than the boom period coefficients (p-value < 0.05).
In untabulated results, we show that our DELR results are robust to an
alternative measure of the relation between performance of the system and
the risk of the bank. Specifically, we follow Acharya et al. [2010] and com-
pute the marginal expected shortfall (MES) of the bank. MES captures the
correlation between a bank’s equity returns and market equity returns on
the days where the market return is in the bottom 5% for the quarter. That
is, it measures the extent to which an individual bank’s returns are low when
the overall (banking) market returns are low.
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TA B L E 4
Sensitivity of Individual Banks’ Tail Risk to Systemic Events
Dependent Variable: CoVaRi |s y s temt
Variables Pooled Boom Bust
DELRt-1 −0.0138 −0.0025 −0.0609∗∗
(0.015) (0.014) (0.026)††
Tradingt-1 −2.0555 −2.2966 −2.3111
(1.622) (1.528) (2.167)
Commercialt-1 0.0832 0.0439 0.2170
(0.136) (0.127) (0.175)
Consumert-1 0.1158 −0.2300 0.6816∗
(0.350) (0.342) (0.389)
Real Estatet-1 −0.0624 −0.0437 −0.1556∗
(0.057) (0.054) (0.080)
Mismatcht-1 −0.1783 −0.1185 −0.3292
(0.188) (0.172) (0.261)
Depositst-1 0.1366∗∗ 0.1230∗∗ 0.1556∗
(0.057) (0.052) (0.084)
Revenue Mixt-1 −0.0542 0.0425 −0.1536
(0.185) (0.169) (0.331)
Capitalt-1 0.3037 0.1375 0.6313
(0.618) (0.557) (1.028)
βMrkt −0.0417∗ −0.0193 −0.1097∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.019) (0.041)
σe ,t−1 −4.8013∗∗∗ −2.9442∗∗∗ −2.6375∗∗
(1.203) (1.101) (1.060)
Sizet-1 −0.1176∗∗∗ −0.1049∗∗∗ −0.1355∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.020)
MTBt-1 −0.0131 −0.0255 0.0065
(0.022) (0.018) (0.043)
Illiquidt-1 0.0149∗∗∗ 0.0136∗∗∗ 0.0097
(0.005) (0.005) (0.009)
Returnt-1 −0.4410∗∗ −0.0769 −0.6849∗∗∗
(0.208) (0.053) (0.196)
%UnEmployt-1 −0.1908∗∗∗ 0.0200 −0.9241∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.056) (0.165)
LoanGrowtht-1 −0.1262 −0.1471 0.0450
(0.115) (0.109) (0.278)
Fixed Effects Year Year Year
N 8,371 6,950 1,861
Adj R 2 0.3790 0.3892 0.4120
OLS pooled regressions of the time period 1996–2009, where CoVaRi |s y s tem is the dependent variable
and is defined as the sum of the system’s weekly contribution to either the bank’s VaR over the market value
of assets or equity for the quarter. DELR (i.e., less timely banks) is an indicator variable set equal to 1 if a
bank’s DELR is below the median DELR, and zero otherwise. Bust years are defined using the NBER dates
for recessionary periods. See the appendix for detailed descriptions of all variables. Year-fixed effects are
included in all regressions and standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered by both bank
and calendar quarter.
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively.
†††, ††, † indicate that the difference between boom and bust coefficients is significant at the 0.01, 0.05,
and 0.10, respectively.
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4.3 DELR AND DOWNSIDE RISK: THE EFFECT OF CAPITAL LEVELS
In this paper, we argue that DELR can degrade bank transparency and
generate expected loss overhangs. Higher opacity-induced financing fric-
tions combined with loss overhangs can generate capital inadequacy con-
cerns that expose the bank to downside risk from a variety of sources. Fur-
ther, reduced transparency can increase opportunities for risk-shifting ac-
tivities, where incentives for such activities are higher when a bank faces
capital inadequacy concerns. Because we theorize that capital inadequacy
concerns combined with lower transparency (e.g., financing frictions, risk-
shifting opportunities) underpin the influence of DELR on tail risk vulnera-
bility, it is important that we investigate the extent to which the connection
between DELR and downside risk is magnified for banks with lower regula-
tory capital levels.
To perform this analysis, each quarter we rank all banks based on their
tier-1 capital levels. We then partition banks into quintiles and define banks
in the lowest quintile of tier-1 capital levels as low capital banks, and banks
in the top four quintiles as high capital banks. The low capital partitions
have average tier-1 capital of 7.8%, where the average for high capital banks
is 11.5%. We then re-run our VaR and CoVaRi |s y s tem analyses separately for
low and high capital firms. We only focus on bust periods as it is shown in
tables 3 and 4 that there is no relation between DELR and either VaR or
CoVaRsys tem|i in boom periods. The results of this analysis are reported in
table 5.
Focusing first on VaR, we see that the coefficient on DELR for the low cap-
ital partition of −0.123 (p-value < 0.01) is significantly different (p-value <
0.01) from the coefficient in the high capital partition of –0.0587. When the
dependent variable is CoVaRi |s y s tem , we see that the coefficient on DELR for
the low capital partition of –0.111 (p-value < 0.01) is significantly different
(p-value < 0.05) from the coefficient in the high capital partition of –0.04.
These results are consistent with DELR-driven capital inadequacy concerns,
operating in conjunction with low transparency, making banks more vul-
nerable to downside risk during recessions. Where Beatty and Liao [2011]
focus on how DELR conditions the sensitivity of current lending decisions
to bank capital, we find that a bank’s capital level conditions the associa-
tion between DELR and downside risk, where this association is significantly
higher for banks with lower regulatory capital levels.
4.4 DELR AND THE CONTRIBUTION OF INDIVIDUAL BANKS TO SYSTEMIC
RISK: CoVaRsys tem|iq
Our final analysis examines how DELR conditions the influence that indi-
vidual banks have in exacerbating the future expected downside risk of the
banking system. To examine the impact of an individual bank on the sys-
tem, we define CoVaRsys tem|i as VaRsys tem1% of the banking system conditional
on the VaR of bank i. The difference between CoVaRsys tem|i conditional on
bank i being in distress (e.g., bank i outcome = VaRiq=1%) and CoVaRsys tem|i
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conditional on the median or “normal” state of bank i (bank i outcome =
VaRiq=50%), CoVaR
i |s y s tem , captures the marginal contribution of a particu-
lar institution to the overall downside risk to the banking system or systemic
risk (Adrian and Brunnermeier [2011]). To compute CoVaRi |s y s tem we esti-
mate the following quantile regressions equations again using weekly data:
X it = γ i1 + γ i2Mt−1 + εit , (13)
X sys temt = αs y s tem|i + δs y s tem|iX it + βs y s tem|iMt−1 + εs y s tem|it . (14)
We then compute the predicted values
VaRiq%,t = γˆ i1 + γˆ i2Mt−1, (15)
CoVaRsys tem|i1%,t = αˆs y s tem|i + δˆs y s tem|i VaRi1%or50%,t + βˆs y s tem|iMt−1. (16)
To capture the effects of the individual bank on the system when moving
from a normal state to distressed state, we compute CoVaRsys tem|i1% as:
CoVaRsys tem|it = CoVaRsys tem|i=VaR1%t − CoVaRsys tem|i=VaR50%t
= αˆs y s tem|i + δˆs y s tem|i
(
VaRi1%,t − VaRi50%,t
)
+ βˆs y s tem|iMt−1. (17)
We again sum weekly CoVaRsys tem|i1% to obtain quarterly measures for the
distributions over equity returns, CoVaRsys tem|i1%t . More negative values in-
dicate that a move of bank i from a normal state to a “distressed” state
produces a larger marginal contribution to the downside risk of the equity
returns of the banking system.
Table 6 reports that the coefficient on DELR in the pooled specification is
0.0122 (p-value < 0.01). After splitting between boom and bust periods, ta-
ble 6 reports that the coefficient on DELR is negative in both the boom and
bust periods (–0.01 and –0.021, respectively), where the difference between
the boom period and bust period coefficients is statistically significant
(p-value < 0.01).
Taken together, the results from table 6 suggest that high DELR banks
contribute more to systemic risk and the effect is greater during economic
downturns. Consistent with high DELR banks increasing systemic risk,
table 6 shows that banks with higher DELR contribute more to the risk of
severe drops in equity values for the aggregate banking sector. We theo-
rize that, when a group of banks all delay loss recognition in good times,
all group members will simultaneously face the consequences of increased
capital inadequacy, low transparency, and investor uncertainty during a
downturn creating systemic effects from banks acting as part of a herd.
4.5 ADDITIONAL TESTS AND ROBUSTNESS
In this section, we report results from performing a number of additional
tests to establish the robustness of our results.
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TA B L E 6
DELR and the Contribution of Individual Banks to Systemic Risk
Dependent Variable:CoVaRsys tem|it
Variables Pooled Boom Bust
DELRt-1 −0.0122∗∗∗ −0.0101∗∗ −0.0209∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.007)†††
Tradingt-1 0.4656 0.4753 0.2271
(0.699) (0.673) (0.792)
Commercialt-1 −0.0799 −0.0676 −0.1119∗
(0.050) (0.050) (0.060)
Consumert-1 0.0511 −0.0427 0.1311
(0.101) (0.123) (0.094)
Real Estatet-1 0.0313 0.0335 0.0218
(0.021) (0.020) (0.025)
Mismatcht-1 −0.0934 −0.0962 −0.0980
(0.076) (0.077) (0.084)
Depositst-1 0.0451∗∗ 0.0424∗ 0.0554∗
(0.023) (0.023) (0.031)
Revenue Mixt-1 0.0833 0.0989 0.0707
(0.066) (0.067) (0.089)
Capitalt-1 −0.1250 −0.1993 0.0591
(0.235) (0.241) (0.295)
βMrkt −0.0244∗∗∗ −0.0183∗∗ −0.0456∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.012)
σe ,t−1 −0.8750∗∗∗ −0.6935∗∗ −0.4812
(0.302) (0.335) (0.342)
Sizet-1 −0.0118∗ −0.0113∗ −0.0099
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008)
MTBt-1 −0.0223∗∗∗ −0.0239∗∗∗ −0.0194
(0.008) (0.008) (0.015)
Illiquidt-1 0.0045∗∗∗ 0.0045∗∗∗ 0.0037
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Returnt-1 −0.0492 0.0046 −0.0934∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.026) (0.035)
%UnEmployt-1 −0.0366∗∗∗ 0.0004 −0.1194∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.015) (0.029)
LoanGrowtht-1 −0.0232 −0.0177 −0.0390
(0.053) (0.051) (0.099)
Fixed Effects Year Year Year
N 8,371 6,860 1,804
Adj R 2 0.1969 0.1998 0.1786
OLS pooled regressions of the time period 1996–2009, where CoVaRsys tem|i is the dependent variable
and is defined as the sum of the firm’s weekly contribution to systemic risk over the quarter for the market
value of equity. DELR (i.e., less timely banks) is an indicator variable set equal to 1 if a bank’s DELR is
below the median DELR, and zero otherwise. Bust years are defined using the NBER dates for recessionary
periods. See the appendix for detailed descriptions of all variables. Year-fixed effects are included in all
regressions and standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered by both bank and calendar
quarter.
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively.
†††, ††, † indicate that the difference between boom and bust coefficients is significant at the 0.01, 0.05,
and 0.10, respectively.
544 R. M. BUSHMAN AND C. D. WILLIAMS
4.5.1. CAMELS, Lagged Values of the Dependent Variable, and Firm Fixed Ef-
fects. An alternative explanation for our reported results is that the varia-
tion in DELR arises from variation in regulator-imposed loss recognition
(e.g., for weaker vs. stronger banks). To control for such differences, we
include proxies for the regulatory CAMELS ratios for the banks. As these
ratings are not released to the public, we follow Duchin and Sosyura [2014]
and include proxies for CAMELS ratings21: C (tier 1 capital), A (nonper-
forming loans/total loans), M&E (ROA),22 L (cash/deposits), S ([short-
term assets-short-term liabilities]/total assets). We also include lagged val-
ues of the dependent variable to correct for endogenous risk persistence.
For brevity, we report the coefficients on DELR and the lagged risk mea-
sures in table 7 for both the boom and bust subsamples. Table 7 shows that
across all downside risk measures the coefficient on DELR continues to be
significantly negative in bust periods, where the bust period coefficients are
significantly larger than the boom period coefficients.
In untablulated results, we include bank fixed effects in addition to the
lagged dependent variables and all other controls. We find that including
bank fixed effects does not have a substantive effect on the DELR coeffi-
cients in any of our downside risk regressions.
4.5.2. Controlling for Differences in Managerial Ability. To rule out the pos-
sibility that DELR is simply capturing differences in managerial ability, we
follow Beatty and Liao [2011] and use ROA to proxy for management qual-
ity based on DeYoung [1998]. In untabulated results, we interact our DELR
variable with ROA and find that all of our results are not only robust to
the inclusion of ROA as a main effect, but also that the coefficient on the
interaction DELR∗ROA is not statistically significant from zero. As a second
test to control for the ability of management, we also include CEO fixed ef-
fects. Despite a significant reduction in sample size, in untabulated results
we find that our results are robust to the inclusion of CEO fixed effects.
4.5.3. The Distribution over Changes in Market Value of Bank Assets. While
our main analyses examine risk with respect to the distribution over equity
returns, Adrian and Brunnermeir [2011] focused on the distribution over
changes in the market value of banks’ assets. Because it is conceptually pos-
sible that the distributions over changes in asset and equity values reflect
different information, we examined the robustness of our results by defin-
ing downside risk with respect to distribution over percentage changes in
the market value of banks’ assets. The market value of a bank’s total assets
21 CAMELS: Capital adequacy, Asset quality,Management, Earnings, Liquidity, Sensitivity to
market risk.
22 Our use of ROA to proxy for management quality follows Beatty and Liao [2011] and
DeYoung [1998]. Using confidential information on CAMELS ratings, DeYoung [1998] finds
that regulators’ management quality assessments correlate with multiple bank characteristics,
among which ROA is most highly correlated with management quality with a simple correla-
tion of 45%.
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is not observable, and so we follow Adrian and Brunnermier [2011] and
estimate the market value of bank assets by using balance sheet leverage
ratios to de-lever the market value of banks’ equity as follows:
Xt = MVAt − MVAt−1MVAt−1 =
(MTBt ∗ BVAt) − (MTBt−1 − BVAt−1)
MTBt−1 ∗ BVAt−1
= MV Et
MV Et−1
∗
[
BVAt/BV Et
BVAt−1/BV Et−1
]
− 1. (18)
MTB is the weekly market to book ratio, BVA (BVE) is the weekly book
value of assets (equity), and MVE is market value of equity. Because book
value of equity and book value of assets are only reported on a quarterly
basis, we linearly interpolate the book value over the quarter on a weekly
basis. In untabulated results we find that all results in the paper are
nearly identical when we use the distribution over asset changes instead of
over equity returns. This occurs because the variation in market value of
asset changes (as we measure it) is overwhelmingly driven by variation in
equity value changes, as the variation in equity returns dominates variation
in changes in balance sheet leverage ratios.
4.5.4. Examining Recessionary Periods Separately. Finally, we examine
whether the results are a general recessionary effect or specific to only one
of the two recessionary periods in our sample. To examine this, we re-run
the analyses including only one of the recessionary periods at a time, while
excluding the other. In untabulated results, we find that our results hold in
both recessionary periods.
5. Summary
Bank regulators are concerned with excessive risk-taking by individual
banks and with the contribution of individual banks to the risk of the fi-
nancial system as a whole. An important unresolved issue is the extent to
which bank transparency plays a role in mitigating or exacerbating such risk
concerns. A key source of bank transparency is publicly disclosed financial
reports that provide bank-specific information to investors and regulators
seeking to understand a bank’s fundamentals in order to guide investment
decisions, discipline risk-taking, and enhance stability. Accounting policy
choices can therefore potentially affect bank risk by impacting bank trans-
parency. In addition to this transparency role, accounting policy can affect
bank stability through its influence over the accounting numbers as quan-
titative inputs into numerical calculations of regulatory covenant measures
such as capital ratios and leverage ratios that banks must continually main-
tain (e.g., Beatty and Liao [2011, 2014]).
In this paper, we investigate relations between banks’ accounting pol-
icy choices and both individual bank risk and risk codependence among
banks. We capture cross-bank variation in accounting policy choices by
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estimating the extent to which individual banks delay expected loan loss
recognition in current provisions (DELR). We investigate the extent to
which DELR is associated with greater vulnerability of banks to three dis-
tinct dimensions of risk: (1) stock market liquidity risk, (2) downside tail
risk of individual banks, and (3) codependence of downside tail risk among
banks.
We hypothesize that DELR is a manifestation of opportunistic loan provi-
sioning behavior that results in reduced bank transparency. Consistent with
our hypothesis, we find that DELR is associated with higher stock market
illiquidity, as well as higher correlations between bank-level illiquidity and
aggregate banking sector illiquidity and returns during recessions (i.e., liq-
uidity risk). Higher illiquidity levels and liquidity risk associated with lower
transparency increase equity financing costs and decreased transparency
can enhance opportunities for banks to engage in risk shifting. Our liq-
uidity risk results also have implications for systemic risk. Increased co-
movement between bank-level illiquidity and banking sector illiquidity and
returns suggests that high DELR banks as a group will simultaneously face
elevated financing frictions when the banking sector is experiencing dis-
tress that impede the group’s access to new capital infusions.
To investigate downside risk vulnerability, we examine the association
between DELR and the lower tail of the distribution over a bank’s (the
banking system’s) equity returns. We find that during recessions DELR is
associated with significantly higher risk of individual banks suffering severe
drops in their equity values, where this association is significantly stronger
for banks with low capital levels. Consistent with increased systemic risk,
we find that DELR is associated with significantly higher codependence be-
tween the downside risk of an individual bank and the downside risk of the
aggregate banking sector. We theorize that downside risk vulnerability at
the individual bank level can translate into systemic risk by virtue of DELR
creating a common source of risk vulnerability across high DELR banks si-
multaneously, which leads to risk codependence among banks and systemic
effects from banks acting as part of a herd.
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